The central fact the West still struggles to accept is simple: the war against Iran, conceived as a rapid, surgical and politically decisive operation, is not delivering the result Washington and Tel Aviv expected. This is not because the United States and Israel lack technological superiority, firepower or deep-strike capabilities. The problem is that military superiority is not translating into strategic victory. The Iranian regime has not collapsed, society has not risen up against the state in the way many Western observers predicted, and the political-military system, though under pressure, is still functioning. That is the first major failure of the American calculation.
Even understanding what is really happening on the battlefield has become extraordinarily difficult. Both sides are releasing limited, filtered and highly selective information. Iran and Israel each claim success, highlight the damage they inflict and downplay the damage they suffer. On both sides, there has effectively been a ban on filming missile impacts, bomb damage and the true scale of destruction. Even satellite imagery has reportedly been restricted. In such conditions, measuring the exact military effect of strikes becomes nearly impossible.
Still, some conclusions can be drawn. Missile exchanges, bombings, drone attacks and retaliatory strikes continue. Images from Israel show significant damage from Iranian missile attacks. Much less is known about the actual impact on Israeli military infrastructure. In Iran, the picture is even more opaque, but the information circulating suggests that a very high proportion of the targets hit are civilian sites, including homes, schools and hospitals. At the same time, Iran appears to be focusing more heavily on military objectives such as air bases, command centers, intelligence headquarters and cyber warfare facilities, especially around Tel Aviv.
One of the most common Western mistakes is to assume that because Iran is firing fewer missiles than in the opening phase, it must be weakening or running out of capabilities. But the pattern appears different. In earlier operations as well, Iran began with dense waves of missiles and drones designed both to saturate Israeli defenses and to strike high-value military targets. In later phases, once Israeli interceptors had already been heavily consumed, Iran could afford to launch fewer missiles but with a much higher likelihood of penetration.
Moreover, the missiles now being used seem more sophisticated. Some appear to carry multiple reentry vehicles or guided submunitions, making interception far more difficult and far more expensive. That matters enormously. If one Iranian missile can force Israel to spend several million dollars in interceptors, and this process repeats day after day, then the conflict becomes not just military but economically unsustainable. Iran, though weaker, is forcing Israel and the United States into a war of expenditure and attrition.
Washington’s original assumption now looks deeply flawed. The opening concept seemed clear enough: strike hard, decapitate the leadership, create a political vacuum, trigger internal revolt and produce regime change. But reality has moved in the opposite direction. The Iranian state has proven far more robust than expected. The population has not broken in the desired direction. In fact, external pressure appears to have produced the opposite effect, reinforcing national cohesion. This is the classic paradox of wars that hit civilians: instead of shattering a society, they often consolidate it.
For years many in the West insisted that most Iranians were ready to rise up against the regime if only a crack appeared at the top. The evidence so far suggests otherwise. Even sectors of society that had recently protested against the state now appear to be closing ranks in the name of national defense. The internal collapse scenario has not materialized. And without it, the logic of the short American war collapses with it.
The information war has made everything worse. Rumors have circulated about the death or incapacitation of top Israeli leaders. Videos have appeared, suspicions of artificial intelligence manipulation have followed, and no serious confirmation has emerged. This is precisely what propaganda in wartime is meant to do: not merely confuse public opinion, but conceal capabilities, vulnerabilities, movements and real damage while preserving surprise. That is what real wartime disinformation looks like.
On the American side, another revealing signal has emerged. A US aircraft carrier was reportedly hit early in the conflict, likely by drones, and later repositioned. The exact damage remains unclear, but even the need to withdraw and replace such an asset sends a message. It suggests that Iran has managed to expose vulnerabilities even in symbols of American power.
The case of Kharg Island is equally revealing. Kharg is strategically vital because it is a key oil export terminal for Iran. The United States struck military facilities there, but not the core oil export infrastructure itself. The reason is obvious. To truly cripple Iran’s oil system would also deepen the global energy crisis and further drive up prices. Washington is already facing the blowback of rising oil costs. It cannot fully exploit its military superiority without harming itself and its allies.
That contradiction is most visible in the Strait of Hormuz. Much is said about Iran “blocking” the strait. But in reality, the most effective blockade may not be physical alone. It is also financial, logistical and psychological. Insurance companies, rising war-risk premiums, shipping fears and market uncertainty are making passage prohibitively expensive. In other words, Iran does not need to close Hormuz completely. It only needs to make transit too risky for rational commercial actors. That is modern asymmetric warfare at its most effective.
The most striking point is that Washington seems not to have fully anticipated this effect. Yet Iran had signaled it clearly. This reveals the irrational side of the American approach: the belief that overwhelming power would automatically deter all serious retaliation. It has not.
Now the United States is trying to draw others in. Requests for support have gone out to European and Asian allies, and even to China. But no one seems willing to be dragged into a conflict whose costs are growing and whose outcome is uncertain. This is perhaps the most politically serious signal of all. The United States is increasingly isolated in a war it helped unleash and no longer seems able to control. It can keep bombing, but it cannot convert bombing into durable political success.
That is why Iran may be weaker in material terms but not necessarily losing strategically. If the American objective was to destabilize Tehran, break the regime, restore confidence in Hormuz, calm markets and demonstrate unquestioned deterrence, then none of those objectives has truly been achieved. And if a war fails to produce the political outcomes for which it was launched, military superiority becomes strategically sterile.
America has discovered that its opponent is more resilient than expected, that the energy and trade costs of war are much higher than anticipated, that allies do not want to be dragged in, and that force alone is no longer enough to bend a state accustomed to living under pressure. That, more than the missile strikes themselves, is the real measure of Washington’s strategic failure.
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