The war in Ukraine as a symptom of a global crisis
The long exchange between John Mearsheimer and Sergey Karaganov is not merely a discussion about the war in Ukraine. It is, in reality, a confrontation between two schools of strategic thought which, despite starting from different assumptions, converge on one disturbing conclusion: the international system built after the Second World War and consolidated after the collapse of the Soviet Union is entering its terminal phase.
According to Karaganov, the Ukrainian conflict did not begin in 2022. Its roots go back at least to the 1990s and are linked to NATO’s eastward expansion. For the Russian strategist, Moscow had warned for decades that the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance would inevitably generate war. Today, in his view, Ukraine is only the most visible theater of a much broader struggle between a declining West and emerging powers reshaping the global balance.
Mearsheimer, while using a less ideological language, shares the view that the origins of the war must be found in the strategic dynamics created by Western expansion into the former Soviet space. Both see the Ukrainian crisis as the collision point between a Russia that considers its security threatened and a West convinced that it can continue expanding its sphere of influence without facing decisive consequences.
The central problem: the West has stopped fearing nuclear war
The core of the debate concerns nuclear deterrence.
Karaganov argues that for roughly seventy years humanity was protected not so much by diplomatic agreements as by fear. The awareness that a war between great powers could degenerate into an atomic exchange prevented leaders from crossing certain red lines. Today, however, that fear is fading.
In his view, European elites and part of the American establishment have progressively lost their sense of risk. The delivery of increasingly sophisticated weapons to Ukraine, the authorization to strike targets on Russian territory, attacks against strategic infrastructure and even operations affecting elements linked to Russia’s nuclear triad suggest that the West believes Moscow is either unable or unwilling to respond radically.
Mearsheimer finds this evolution astonishing.
During the Cold War, he recalls, no one would have imagined that a force backed by the United States could enter Soviet territory or strike facilities connected to Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Today, however, such developments are treated almost as normal.
For the American professor, this shows that the West has forgotten the fundamental lessons learned during forty years of nuclear confrontation.
From the Cold War to the new age of uncertainty
One of the most interesting aspects of the exchange is the comparison with the Cold War.
According to Mearsheimer, there was fierce competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also a mutual understanding of limits that could not be crossed. Red lines were clear.
When the Soviets intervened in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the West protested but avoided any direct military response because policymakers understood the danger of escalation.
Today, that system of informal rules no longer exists.
Communication between great powers has deteriorated. Arms control treaties have gradually been dismantled. Diplomatic structures that once helped manage crises during the Cold War have been weakened or abandoned.
The result is a far more unstable strategic environment.
The most controversial issue: limited nuclear use
The most disturbing part of the discussion concerns the possibility of limited nuclear use.
Karaganov explicitly states that Russia possesses the means to win a confrontation with Europe if it decided to employ tactical or limited nuclear capabilities. Yet he also considers such a choice a moral and political disaster.
His reasoning is straightforward.
If Moscow used a small number of warheads against military or symbolic targets in Europe, he believes a nuclear response from the United States would be unlikely. Washington, in his view, would not risk the destruction of its own cities to defend European targets.
In this scenario, deterrence would be restored through the psychological shock produced by the use of the atomic weapon.
Mearsheimer understands the strategic logic but insists on one fundamental point: a total nuclear war can have no winners.
His interpretation is that some Russian strategists are not thinking in terms of global nuclear war, but rather of limited and coercive nuclear use aimed at forcing the adversary to step back.
This is the logic of strategic coercion developed during the Cold War by theorists such as Thomas Schelling.
Germany returns to the center of European history
A significant part of the debate revolves around Germany.
For Karaganov, the prospect of a heavily rearmed Germany represents one of the greatest strategic dangers for Russia.
The memory of the two world wars continues to deeply shape the Russian view. In his reasoning, Berlin should never acquire autonomous nuclear capabilities because this would radically alter the European strategic balance.
Mearsheimer offers a more geopolitical interpretation.
As long as the United States guaranteed European security, the so-called German question had been neutralized. Germany was embedded within a security structure led by Washington.
But if the United States were to significantly reduce its presence in Europe, Berlin would inevitably be pushed to develop autonomous military capabilities.
This process, Mearsheimer observes, would not worry Russia alone. It would also generate concern in France, the United Kingdom and many other European countries.
The crisis of NATO and the possible American disengagement
Another central theme is the future of the Atlantic Alliance.
According to both speakers, the United States is progressively shifting its strategic center of gravity toward the Indo-Pacific.
Washington’s main challenge is no longer Russia but China.
This shift implies a reduction of American attention to Europe and a growing demand that European allies assume greater military responsibility.
If this trend continues, Europe will be forced to completely redefine its security system.
The rise of Eurasia
Karaganov interprets the European crisis as part of an even broader transformation.
In his view, the center of world politics is moving toward Eurasia.
China, India, Iran, Türkiye, Indonesia and other emerging powers represent the future pillars of the global balance. Europe, which for five centuries occupied a central position, is destined to gradually lose strategic relevance.
In this vision, the twenty-first century will be dominated by continental spaces and new economic, energy and technological networks linking Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
The geoeconomic dimension of the crisis
Behind the military confrontation lies an economic war of historic scale.
Sanctions against Russia, the fragmentation of supply chains, the race for technological autonomy and the militarization of energy markets are only the first signs of a deeper transformation.
The globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is turning into competition between geopolitical blocs.
Energy, semiconductors, strategic raw materials, artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure are becoming instruments of national power as important as armed forces.
The strategic scenario of the next twenty years
The conclusion of the exchange is perhaps the most significant point.
Neither Mearsheimer nor Karaganov believes that the war in Ukraine represents the final stage of the crisis.
Even if a ceasefire or a frozen conflict were eventually reached, the structural tensions between Russia and the West would remain intact.
Great power competition will continue to unfold across multiple dimensions: military, economic, technological, energy and cultural.
For both thinkers, the real danger is not a deliberate decision to start a world war. The greater risk is the accumulation of miscalculations, mistaken perceptions, gradual escalation and strategic misunderstandings.
In other words, the world is entering a phase resembling the years that preceded the great tragedies of the twentieth century, with one fundamental difference: today there are thousands of nuclear warheads, hypersonic systems, offensive cyber capabilities, autonomous drones and technologies that drastically reduce decision-making time.
For this reason, the debate between Mearsheimer and Karaganov is not only about Russia, Ukraine or NATO. It concerns the central problem of the twenty-first century: how to prevent the transition toward a new multipolar order from degenerating into a crisis capable of overwhelming the entire international civilization.
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