Ethiopia: Unresolved Conflicts and the Risk of Fragmentation
The mosaic of conflicts and tensions characterizing Ethiopia today represents a monumental challenge for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Having come to power in 2018 with great promises of reform and reconciliation, his government now faces a national crisis that extends far beyond the war in Tigray.
For two years, national and international attention was focused on the war between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, which concluded with the Pretoria peace agreement in 2022. However, this focus obscured a complex reality: an escalation of ethnic and anti-government clashes affecting other regions of the country. From Benishangul-Gumuz to the Somali region, and the southern areas of the former Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), violence has intensified, revealing deep political and institutional crises.
The ethnofederal model, introduced by the late Tigrayan Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, is now at the center of criticism. Designed to balance regional autonomy with national unity, it has instead fueled division and instability. Administrative restructuring in the SNNPR aimed at improving access to resources and services has only increased interethnic tensions and autonomy demands. Regions like Amhara and Oromia continue to experience violence from groups like the Fano militias and the Oromo Liberation Army, while areas like Benishangul-Gumuz, home to the Grand Renaissance Dam, remain hotspots of tension.
The ethnic fragmentation and inability to manage local conflicts raise the specter of Ethiopia’s “Balkanization.” With over 120 million people divided among more than 80 ethnic groups, the country needs a governance model that balances diversity and unity. Ethiopia’s future hinges on inclusive dialogue and political vision beyond the divisive ethnofederal framework. Only a reconciliation process combining local autonomy with national unity can restore stability and offer its citizens a peaceful future.
The European Union in Africa: A Predicted Failure
The EU’s military missions in Africa are a pattern of overblown ambitions, negligible results, and abrupt withdrawals. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso show how a single coup can derail everything. The 2024 SIPRI Yearbook reports a 13% decrease in personnel deployed in African peace operations, dropping from 114,984 in 2022 to 100,568 in 2023.
What purpose do these missions serve? To fund illusions. The U.S.-backed Chad partnership, led by Viktor Orbán, reallocated €14 million from the European Peace Facility to train local forces. Similarly, the Gulf of Guinea mission, distributing millions to Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin, aims to stem migration but has yet to show tangible results.
In Mozambique, the EU trained 1,700 soldiers to combat jihadists in Cabo Delgado with an initial investment of €89 million. However, Rwanda’s deployment in the region has achieved more with less fanfare. Meanwhile, contradictions abound as the EU funds Kigali while Rwanda supports rebel militias in the Congo.
While the EU clings to ethical standards and “international law,” Russia and China gain political and economic footholds. African nations now prefer bilateral agreements with less demanding and more effective partners. Europe’s growing irrelevance in Africa is an announced fiasco: enormous spending and meager outcomes.
Zambia: An Economy in Search of Balance
Zambia faces a layered crisis: years of debt restructuring, the worst drought in 20 years, and an energy crisis. With 83% of its energy sourced from hydropower, water shortages have left much of the population without electricity for over 20 hours a day. Agriculture, employing a quarter of Zambians, has collapsed, exacerbating poverty and driving inflation to 15%.
The road out of its 2020 default has been long. Zambia, the first country to default during the pandemic, became a test case for the G20 Common Framework. Negotiations brought more favorable terms from creditors, but IMF-imposed reforms, like energy subsidy cuts, risk worsening living conditions.
Zambia’s future may hinge on copper, accounting for 70% of exports. The government aims to quintuple production by 2030, but declining output and delayed foreign investments threaten this goal. Ironically, rapid economic recovery could lead to higher debt interest rates under IMF rules, negating recent progress.
As the U.S. and China vie for influence, Zambia must navigate these waters carefully. The Lobito Corridor and Tazara railway projects symbolize this geopolitical rivalry, offering opportunities but also risks of exploitation. Zambia’s future is at a crossroads: a potential key player in the global energy transition, yet hindered by internal inequalities and climate shocks.
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Africa, Ethiopia, Zambia, European Union, China, United States, ethnic conflicts, ethnofederalism, Abiy Ahmed, Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, geopolitics, infrastructure, Lobito Corridor, Tazara Railway, energy transition, copper, cobalt, G20 Common Framework, IMF, sovereign debt, investments, sustainable development, political instability, Grand Renaissance Dam, ONLF, migration, international relations, global rivalry, African economy.
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